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Progress in Global Surveillance and Response Capacity 10 
Years after Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome   
[Announcer] This program is presented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Ten years have elapsed since the World Health Organization, the WHO, issued its first global 
alert for an unexplained illness, which it named severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS.  A 
few days later, the Institute of Medicine, the IOM, released a report, Microbial Threats to Health, 
which highlighted many of the issues and challenges raised by SARS. This anniversary provides 
us with an opportunity to reflect on the international response led by WHO to this new global 
microbial threat, a response that has resulted in control of the pandemic that resulted in greater 
than 8,000 cases and nearly 800 deaths in more than 30 countries and had a large economic 
impact.  
Lessons of SARS 
Many features of the SARS epidemic and the public health response are worth recalling because 
they provide reminders of challenges posed by the emergence of a new disease transmissible 
from person-to-person. Some of these features include the initial lack of field investigative 
capacity, reference laboratory testing, and reporting transparency from southern China, which 
resulted in a three-month delay in the reporting of severe unexplained illness to WHO; the 
important role played by an alert clinician in Hanoi, Vietnam, in the initial recognition and 
response to the illness; the rapid spread of illness to more than 30 countries; the effects on health 
care workers and family members who were most at risk for person-to-person spread of the 
infection; the ultimate success of early patient isolation, contact tracing, quarantine, and infection 
control measures; the importance of rigorous attention to biosafety in laboratory settings; the 
stigmatization of affected groups; the economic impact as a result of major disruptions in 
international travel and commerce; the identification of the mode and circumstances of cross-
species transmission; and the role of “superspreaders” and superspreading events in the rapid 
dissemination of the illness. In addition, the leadership provided by WHO facilitated timely 
exchange of new information among clinicians, epidemiologists, and laboratory investigators 
around the world; these efforts included the formation of a global network of virology and 
pathology laboratories using modern diagnostic methods contributing to the rapid identification, 
characterization, and sequencing of the agent and the timely dissemination of critical information 
and guidance. 
Emergence in Guangdong Province 
Details are sketchy about the earliest phase of SARS spreading in Southern China, but the best 
retrospective analysis put the initial cases and clusters around mid-November 2002; spread to 
health care workers and family members was a critical aspect of the amplification of the 
epidemic during January 2003. Initial investigations were conducted by provincial public health 
authorities who did not recognize or failed to report the potential global implications of the 
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epidemic, and initial laboratory investigations incorrectly focused on a possible Chlamydia–like 
organism as the etiologic agent. 
Superspreading Events Linked to the Hotel Metropole 
Several superspreading events contributed to the dissemination of the virus. Some of the most 
dramatic examples included those associated with the Hotel Metropole in Hong Kong, the Amoy 
Gardens apartment complex in Hong Kong, Air China flight 112 from Hong Kong to Beijing, 
and an acute care hospital in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.  
The episode at Hotel Metropole that contributed greatly to the initial cross-border spread of the 
disease was particularly noteworthy. The cluster of SARS cases at Hotel Metropole in Hong 
Kong in 2003, the first superspreading event recognized outside mainland China, was 
responsible for the spread of the epidemic from Guangdong Province to Canada, Vietnam, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong itself. In addition to the first 13 cases originally associated with the 
Hotel Metropole, a follow-up cohort study of guests from Canada, Germany, England, and the 
United States who stayed at the hotel concurrent with the index case-patient, a physician from 
Guangdong, identified an additional seven cases meeting the probable or confirmed case 
definition for SARS coronavirus infection. All 20 cases were associated with transmission of 
SARS on the ninth floor of the hotel, where the index case-patient had stayed for one night 
before becoming critically ill and being admitted to a local hospital the next day. Three deaths 
occurred among identified hotel guests, resulting in a case-fatality rate of 15 percent. Known 
secondary SARS cases were associated with at least 42 percent of the guest rooms on the ninth 
floor. 
The high rate of infection among guests staying on the ninth floor at the Hotel Metropole is 
remarkable because of the absence of direct contact with the index case-patient. For example, 
one resident of Hong Kong who visited a friend on the ninth floor but was not a hotel guest 
likely acquired his infection during his visit; this person subsequently infected 143 people at 
Prince of Wales Hospital in Hong Kong. Epidemiologic evidence suggested an environmental 
route of SARS transmission. Indeed, environmental contamination with SARS was identified on 
the carpet in front of the index case-patient’s room and three nearby rooms and on their door 
frames but not inside the rooms, and in the air intake vents near the centrally located elevators. 
Guest rooms had positive air pressure relative to the corridor, and there was no direct air flow of 
air between rooms. The lack of air flow between rooms and the absence of SARS coronavirus 
RNA detected inside guest rooms suggests that secondary infections occurred not in guest rooms, 
but in the common areas of the ninth floor, such as the corridor or the elevator hall. These areas 
could have been contaminated through body fluids generated by the index case-patient; other 
guests were then infected by fomites or aerosols while passing through these same areas. 
Efficient spread of SARS coronavirus via small-particle aerosols was observed in several 
superspreading events in health care settings during an airplane flight and in an apartment 
complex.  
Recognition and Reporting from Hanoi 
One of the guests at the Metropole, a business traveler, was hospitalized at the French Hospital in 
Hanoi. Called to the investigation into the subsequent illness of health care workers at the 
  
Progress in Global Surveillance and Response Capacity 10 Years after Acute Severe Respiratory 
Syndrome 
Page 3 of 5 June 2013 
hospital was Dr. Carlo Urbani, a WHO physician specializing in parasitology and who is known 
for having the mindset of an alert clinician and a strong dedication to the principles of public 
health. In a series of emails from Hanoi to his colleagues at WHO, Dr. Urbani sent some of the 
first messages of alarm and detailed descriptions of the clinical features of what would come to 
be known as SARS. His reports would lead to an aggressive response by the government of 
Vietnam, which quarantined the hospital staff and ultimately contained the epidemic there. It 
also raised the alarm with colleagues at WHO and the CDC who would work to characterize and 
contain the global epidemic. Dr. Urbani himself became infected and was hospitalized in 
Bangkok, where he insisted on repeated sampling of his own respiratory tract that provided some 
of the first isolates of the novel coronavirus. Dr. Urbani died on March 29, 2003, one of many 
health care workers who responded to those in need only to become victims themselves. 
Health Care–associated Transmission in Toronto and Taiwan 
Health care facilities played a substantial role throughout the SARS outbreak as sites of efficient 
transmission leading to acceleration of disease in communities. These facilities also played a 
critical role in stopping SARS through strict implementation of infection control practices.  
The first cases of SARS in Toronto occurred very early in the global outbreak. A 78-year-old 
woman who stayed at the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong in late February 2003 returned to 
Toronto before dying at home. However, her son had been infected and was subsequently 
admitted to a Toronto hospital, where nosocomial transmission led to more than 100 cases 
among patients, health care workers, and visitors. Prompt institution of airborne, contact, and 
droplet infection control practices led to an apparent cessation of transmission, and on May 14, 
WHO declared that Toronto was no longer a SARS-infected area. Control recommendations 
were relaxed, and the crisis appeared to have ended; however, unrecognized infection continued 
among a small number of patients and visitors. Eventually, transmission to health care workers, 
patients, and visitors resurged, leading to an additional 79 cases. After strict infection control 
practices and vigilance for SARS were reinstituted, the last case was recognized in mid-June, and 
no other cases were recorded thereafter. 
The experience in Taiwan was very different. Soon after the recognition of the novel coronavirus 
in Hong Kong, officials in Taiwan instituted rigorous port entry screening and isolation of 
persons who had suspected SARS among returning travelers and their contacts. Public health and 
academic medical officials focused exhaustive efforts on accurately diagnosing cases of SARS in 
travelers. This approach appeared to work well for six weeks, suggesting that SARS could be 
prevented from entering the island. However, despite these measures, unrecognized transmission 
of SARS began occurring in the community. SARS in a hospital laundry worker at the large 
urban Ho Ping Hospital led to exposure of staff and patients and ignited an explosive outbreak 
that spread to other hospitals and the community. To contain the transmission, patients, staff, and 
visitors were quarantined in the facility. The use of “cordon sanitaire” had rarely been invoked in 
modern times. More than 1,000 persons were quarantined; some tossed soft drink bottles from 
windows with protest messages, others communicated the disarray within the facility through 
cell phone messages, and a few escaped. Public health officials rapidly pivoted to prevent a 
potential emerging infectious disease catastrophe. The epidemic curve for Taiwan reveals the 
dramatic rapid rise in cases resulting from the hospital outbreak. Strict infection control practices 
were mandated in all health care settings. SARS evaluation centers, or Fever Clinics, were 
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constructed outside hospital emergency departments. Community use of face masks, fever 
checks on entry to commercial establishments, and extensive community outreach and education 
were used to mitigate the impact of SARS. After two months of epidemic spread leading to more 
than 600 cases, SARS was eventually contained, and no further cases were reported. 
The Legacy of SARS 
The outbreak showed how rapidly a new, virulent pathogen could spread and how disruptive the 
effects could be. The palpable impact of SARS was translated into action in the form of 
pandemic influenza planning and surveillance efforts, a greater focus on global health security, 
improved laboratory and surveillance networks, and most important, the revision of the 
International Health Regulations, the IHR.  
The legacy of SARS is evident in many other efforts, as well. New national public health 
agencies have been created in Canada and the United Kingdom. The WHO Global Outbreak 
Alert and Response Network has been strengthened. The Global Disease Detection Program was 
established at the CDC, with the aim of strengthening countries’ efforts in training, surveillance, 
and outbreak response and the establishment of 10 Regional Centers by 2012. The International 
Association of National Public Health Institutes has been created. The Training Programs in 
Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network has expanded, and its regional partners 
have been strengthened.  
Perhaps the most important legacy of SARS is the recognition of the critical need for a 
multilateral response, led by WHO, in the event of a rapidly moving but ultimately containable 
global epidemic. The central role of WHO in coordinating the laboratory network that identified 
the etiology and shared reagents, the epidemiology network that characterized the spread and 
identified the most effective control measures, and the policy and communications network that 
incorporated rapidly changing knowledge into measured travel advisories were critical for the 
control of the epidemic and a credit to WHO. 
The One Health movement, which emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration 
to address issues at the interface of human health, animal health, and environmental/ecosystem 
health, has gained momentum. The US Agency for International Development has supported the 
Emerging Pandemic Threats Program in an effort to strengthen prediction, detection, response, 
and amelioration programs in parts of the world shown to be at particular risk for emergence of 
new diseases.  
Looking Forward 
While many disease detection and control improvements have been implemented in the past 10 
years, important gaps in global capacity and coordination remain. Some examples include the 
need to greatly strengthen and monitor the national capacity required for full compliance with 
IHR 2005, including ensuring that adequate numbers of trained personnel are available to 
support the response to a public health emergency, that surveillance systems are capable of 
detecting public health emergencies, that access is adequate to laboratory diagnostic capabilities 
that can identify a range of emerging epidemic pathogens, and that countries have adequate rapid 
response capacity for public health emergencies. In addition, there is a need for state of the art, 
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affordable countermeasures; workable approaches for equitable distribution of countermeasures 
when emergencies arise; a system to facilitate the conduct of research to evaluate treatment 
options during public health emergencies; and tools to assess the utility of social media in 
strengthening capacity for disease surveillance, event detection, and situational awareness. 
 
I’m Dr. Mike Miller for Emerging Infectious Diseases, and I’ve been reading an abridged 
version of Progress in Global Surveillance and Response Capacity 10 Years After Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome. You can read the entire article online now in the June 2013 issue of 
Emerging Infectious Diseases at cdc.gov/eid. 
 
If you’d like to comment on this podcast, send an e-mail to eideditor@cdc.gov. 
[Announcer] For the most accurate health information, visit www.cdc.gov, or call 1-800-CDC-INFO. 
